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Abstract
The paper explores the causes of China’s rising manufacturing exports to the EU
after WTO accession. While the European trade policy environment remained largely
unchanged in most sectors, a spillover from a change in US trade policies towards
China is emphasized. In the proposed model the transmission occurs through a global
component of the fixed costs firms must pay in order to export. If a large fraction of
this component can be covered from exporting to one destination, exporters will serve
also other markets to maximize their profits. The empirical analysis makes use of the
removal of US tariff uncertainty in conjunction with China’s WTO accession. It shows
that: (i) the structure of China’s export boom to the EU conforms to the pattern of
US tariff uncertainty; (ii) the adjustment takes place at the extensive margin, (i.e. a
good is exported to more destinations); and (iii) the effect phases out after a few years.
The results have implications for the scope of international policy negotiations and
provide suggestive evidence on the nature of the fixed costs that manufacturing firms
in low-wage countries must overcome.
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1 Introduction
When China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, industrialized
countries saw an increasing amount of Chinese goods flowing into their domestic markets.
Since then, numerous studies have been investigating the consequences of the increased com-
petition on domestic firms and workers. However, little is known about the fundamental
causes of China’s export boom. Import duties levied on Chinese products mostly corre-
sponded to preferential rates even before WTO entry. This rules out tariff reductions as the
most obvious explanation in standard trade models.1 In search of alternative causes, recent
studies appealed to the idea of trade policy uncertainty (TPU). Several papers show that a
US policy change explains well the timing and structure of China’s export boom to the US
(Handley and Lima˜o, 2013; Feng et al., 2014). It also conforms to sectoral patterns observed
in the decline of US manufacturing employment since 2001 (Pierce and Schott, 2013).
While the US policy change towards China reconciles the evolution of their bilateral
trade relationship, it does not explain the surge of Chinese exports to other high-income
countries. In particular, the EU experienced a similar increase of Chinese goods flowing into
its markets. This is surprising, because EU trade policies towards China were less uncertain
and did not change in the way they did in the US. China’s tariff status in the EU was
governed under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Since the 1980s, it grants
preferential tariffs below most-favored-nations (MFN) rates, and incorporates a transparent,
performance-based graduation mechanism. Inspecting the applicable EU tariffs on Chinese
products since the mid-1990s suggests that they decreased slower than those for most other
trade partners. Shortly after China’s WTO entry they actually increased due to graduation
from the preferential GSP rates.2 Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows that, after WTO entry,
1Frequently used procedures were, thus, using China’s export structure observed in other destinations as
an instrument for domestic market penetration (e.g. Autor et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014). Some studies
exploit the removal of quotas in the textile and clothing industry (e.g. Brambilla et al., 2010; Utar, 2014).
2This pattern is revealed by EU tariff schedules available at the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS)
databases and from the several European Council regulations of the GSP in this period.
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China’s exports to the EU departed from its long- and medium-run trend.3
Figure 1: Real Commodity Exports from China to EU-15 Countries; Log-scale; 1962-2011
WTO Member
Avg. annual growth rates:
 
                     1962−2001: 12%
 
                     2001−2011: 19%
1962 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Note: Author’s calculations based on NBER-UN World Trade Flows, UN Comtrade, and Penn World Tables
8.0. Exports expressed in international dollars (PPP 2005). Fitted line shows trend for 1962-2001 and 95%
confidence intervals.
This paper explores the possibility that the US policy change towards China encouraged
Chinese exports to the EU. In doing so it extends existing work where the mechanism through
which bilateral TPU operates provides no explanation of a spillover to multilateral trade.
Feng et al. (2014) suggest that the removal of US tariff uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters
facilitated market entry through a reduction of the expected tariff rate. This is also suggested
by Handley and Lima˜o (2013) who, as an additional mechanism, consider technology upgrades
by firms that exported to the US before the policy change. However, since such technology
upgrades are modelled to reduce distribution costs in the destination, the effect is limited to
their bilateral setting. To generate a spillover, this paper considers an alternative channel.
Similar to the exposition of Hanson and Xiang (2011), it assumes that Chinese firms willing
to export must incur both a country-specific and a global fixed cost. Empirical evidence
3Throughout this paper, the European Union will be referred to as the EU-15; i.e. the countries consti-
tuting the EU between 1995 and 2004.
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from Iacovone and Javorcik (2012) justifies the assumption of a global fixed cost for low-
wage countries. They observe that Mexican firms upgrade their products prior to becoming
exporters.
The proposed model suggests that a change in US policies towards China lowers the pro-
ductivity threshold at which its firms can profitably export to third countries, given that
they serve the US, too. Generally, the effect is larger when the policy-making economy is
able to cover a major fraction of the global fixed cost. Bilateral fixed costs ensure that more
productive firms export to a larger number of destinations, a stylized pattern in manufac-
turing trade data (e.g. Eaton et al., 2004). A reduction of TPU in the US implies that
China increases its exports to the EU. This occurs at the extensive margin through entry
of firms into new destination markets. To test the predictions empirically, the paper uses
disaggregated data on Chinese exports in the period 1995-2005. The impact of the US policy
change is evaluated via a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy. It exploits cross-product
differences of the US “tariff threat” under TPU, and compares the periods before and after
China’s WTO entry. The results reveal a robust and positive impact of the US policy change
on Chinese exports to the EU. The estimated coefficients appear to be in reasonable orders
of magnitude, considering model parameter values used in the literature. It is also confirmed
that trade increases at the extensive margin, i.e. through the creation of new trade rela-
tionships at the product-destination level. Further analyses provide suggestive evidence in
support of a redistribution of global fixed costs. An extended sample period up to the year
2012 reveals that the effect of the US policy change phases out after a few years.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. It shows that bilateral trade
policies are not without consequences for third countries, especially when large economies
are involved. This extends the scope of the trade creating effects observed in bilateral stud-
ies (Handley, 2012; Handley and Lima˜o, 2012, 2013). The proposed transmission channel,
a global fixed cost component, generalizes the findings of Hanson and Xiang (2011), who
focussed in their analysis on services exports. Although global fixed costs seem to contradict
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stylized patterns where firms enter markets one by one, a reason for why this could apply
in the presented case is the large amount of processing trade in China (Amiti and Freund,
2010). It suggests that firms do not sell their goods directly to consumers but rather produce
for firms in high-income countries which then place the good on the market. Chinese firms
pay fixed costs to meet general standards required by those firms, irrespective of their prove-
nance. Country-specific fixed costs remain an important feature of manufacturing trade, as
they influence the costs of moving goods between source and destination countries. Finally,
as product-specific trade policies and uncertainty contribute to the formation of trade pat-
terns and investment, they might affect the development of seemingly random patterns of
specialization observed across similar countries (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the trade policy environments faced
by Chinese exporters, and argues that TPU was higher in the US than in the EU. Section 3
introduces the theoretical model, which links bilateral policies to a multilateral dimension and
derives the testable predictions. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and the data used
to carry out the analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 US and EU Trade Policies towards China
2.1 China-US Trade Relations
In the late 1970s the US and China established their diplomatic relations. In 1980 the
US granted China preliminary MFN status for its exports. Prior tariffs corresponded to
the “Column 2” schedule the US typically applies to non-market economies. These were
originally defined under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. In many cases Column 2 rates
are much higher than the MFN rates, which were gradually dismantled during GATT/WTO
negotiations. The preliminary nature of China’s MFN status in the US entailed the risk that
it would return to apply Column 2 rates.
Approval of MFN rates for China required a majority of votes in the US Congress, and
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guaranteed the status for one additional year. Accordingly, Chinese exporters could be
certain about applied tariffs in the present year but not for those that would follow. Handley
and Lima˜o (2013) quote a number of business practitioners and politicians suggesting that
this form of TPU deterred investments into Chinese exports to the US. Moreover, in the
1990s it was witnessed that China’s MFN status was close to being overturned. In the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, in 1989, political opposition to China’s MFN
status arose, pointing out the violation of human rights standards. Pierce and Schott (2013)
emphasize that, in the early 1990s, votes sufficed for a return to Column 2 tariffs, but the
US Senate failed to act on this. Shortly before China’s WTO entry, in the years 1997-2001,
the votes against its MFN status amounted to 38 percent, on average. During these years,
political tensions between the two countries remained. In 1999, NATO accidentally bombed
the Chinese embassy in Serbia, and in 2001 China refused to return a US surveillance plane
after its collision with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea. It was disassembled
and returned to the US after several diplomatic interventions.
The entry of China into the WTO was decided in December 2001 and has been effec-
tive since January 2002. Upon this event the US granted China “permanent normal trade
relations” (PNTR). This removed the inhibiting effect of TPU for Chinese exporters and
encouraged their entry into the US market. In particular, the fact that the preliminary MFN
status was never actually overturned makes this policy change appropriate for consideration
as a natural experiment. Its evaluation requires information about the US Column 2 and
MFN tariff schedules for the years prior to China’s WTO accession. Figure 2 shows how
these rates differ according to the US tariff data that is going to be used in this paper. It
shows that MFN rates gradually decline to below 5% for an average manufacturing product,
while Column 2 rates increased from 34 to 38 percent. The log difference between the two
rates, calculated for 1999, suggests that the threat of tariff increases was present across all
industries.4
4In Panel (b) of Figure 2 the threat is calculated as ln τCol − ln τMFN ; a tariff of 5% implies τ = 1.05.
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Figure 2: Average US MFN and Column-2 Tariffs 1989-2001, and the Tariff Threat towards
China
(a) US Column-2 and MFN Tariff (%)
Column 2 Tariff (threat)
MFN Tariff (applied)
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Note: Author’s calculations based on US Tariff Data (Feenstra et al., 2002). Horizontal axis of Panel (b)
denotes manufacturing sectors and their sub-chapters: I Chemicals, II Plastic/Rubber, III Hides/Leather, IV
Wood Products, V Textiles, VI Apparel/Footwear, VII Stone/Glass, VIII Metals, IX Machinery/Electronics,
X Transport, XI Other Manufactures.
2.2 China-EU Trade Relations
China and the former European Community (EC) agreed on an equivalent to PNTR in 1979,
which established China’s MFN status in Europe. In addition, China became a beneficiary
country under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) in 1980. The GSP grants pref-
erential market access to developing countries through discounts on applied MFN rates. In
contrast to the China-US relations, the European GSP entails a lower degree of TPU, as it
sets out tariff preferences for several years. The GSP also includes a graduation mechanism
which implies that a country may return to MFN rates. This happens when it reaches a
certain level of economic development, or when it becomes a dominant exporter of a good
in comparison to other GSP beneficiaries. These criteria are transparent so that Chinese
exporters should have faced less uncertainty regarding future tariffs. When China entered
the WTO, nothing changed in these formal procedures.
Figure 3 depicts European MFN and GSP tariffs, as well as those applicable to China for
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Figure 3: Average European Union Applied Tariffs (%); Ad-valorem Equivalents, 1995-2012
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Note: Author’s calculations based on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and European Council Reg-
ulations (EC) No 3281/94, 2820/98, 2501/2001, 2331/2003, 980/2005, 732/2008, and 512/2011.
an average manufacturing good. The former gradually decline and evolve proportionally.5
Tariffs on Chinese goods declined at a lower rate until 2004. Since 2005 they increased
due to graduation from GSP preferences and have fully returned to MFN rates since 2006.
Altogether, the European trade environment, in terms of applied tariffs, appears to have
worsened for China, and so it can barely explain China’s rising exports to the EU since 2002.
3 Policy Spillover
This section attempts to rationalize the rise of Chinese exports to the EU. It presents first the
bilateral framework similar to Handley and Lima˜o (2013) and then expands on it to establish
a channel through which bilateral policies affect the multilateral export performance.
5The local MFN peak in 2002 is driven by a number of steel products where the EU temporarily raised
the tariff rate. This occurred in response to the rise of US steel tariffs in March 2002 under president George
W. Bush.
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3.1 Baseline Model
3.1.1 Setup
Demand. Following the Melitz (2003) framework monopolistic firms j consider demand
of utility-maximizing consumers. Consumers in country n allocate a fraction 0 < µ < 1 of
their expenditures on product J across foreign varieties XJ . The rest is spent on a domestic
nume´raire, 0J . XJ is defined as a CES aggregator over available varieties j ∈ ΩJn so that
demand is given by
XJn =
(∫
j∈ΩJn
xjdj
)1/
. (1)
The elasticity of substitution is stated in the exponents, σ ≡ 1/(1−) > 1. Total expenditure
on differentiated goods, EJn, the price for a variety, pjn, and the aggregate price index,
PJn ≡
[∫
j∈ΩJn p
1−σ
jn dj
]1/(1−σ)
, determine the demand for variety j in country n:
xjn =
EJn
PJn
(
pjn
PJn
)−σ
(2)
Supply. Monopolistic firms produce only one variety and charge a mark-up over their
marginal costs in order to maximize profits. The price consumers in destination n have to
pay for variety j is determined by the firm’s productivity parameter, ϕ(j), wages in the
exporting country, w, the costs of shipping the good to country n, dJn ≥ 1, and by the tariff
rate, τJn ≥ 1,
pjn =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
w
ϕj
dJnτJn. (3)
The only variety-specific component is the productivity of firm j.
Firm Entry. The profit function of the firm is pi = (p˜− c)x− f . The unit cost parameter
is given by cjn ≡ dJnτJn(w/ϕj) whereas the unit price p˜jn ≡ pjn/τJn received by the firm
is discounted by the tariff collected at the border. Substituting (2) and (3) into the profit
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function states the problem of the firm that considers exporting to n
pijn = τ
−σ
Jn
(
dJn
ϕj
)1−σ
EJn (1− )
(
w
PJn
)1−σ
− fJn. (4)
A positive fixed cost fJn > 0 prevents firms from exporting to n when operating profits are
too low. Using pijn = 0 identifies the marginal firm which is indifferent between exporting
and not-exporting. It has productivity
ϕ∗Jn = τ
σ
σ−1
Jn
[
fJn
EJn(1− )
] 1
σ−1
(
dJnw
PJn
)
. (5)
Higher applied tariffs, τ , shipping costs, d, or fixed costs, f , require a higher firm productivity
to pass the zero-profit cutoff (ZPC). Higher demand E or prices P in the destination market
allow less productive firms to export profitably.
3.1.2 Tariff Uncertainty
The analysis of tariff uncertainty considers the possibility that τ s takes different values de-
pending on the policy regime faced in destination n: s = {p, np}. If the importing country
grants preferential market access (s = p), the tariff is lower than with non-preferential access
(s = np), i.e. τ p ≤ τnp.
In the context of this paper, interest focusses on the removal of uncertainty regarding
the application of preferential tariffs. As long as this uncertainty exists, firms do not know
how future tariffs will be. They assume that a shift from preferential to non-preferential
tariffs occurs with probability 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The expected tariff can be written as a weighted
geometric average of the two scenarios, τE = (τnp)δ(τ p)(1−δ). This assumption is made to
simplify the exposition, as well as the application of the model to the data.6 It implies that
6The characterization of uncertainty in related papers is more explicit. Handley and Lima˜o (2013) analyze
alternative policy regimes and their probabilities within a Markov transition matrix, but they rule out by
assumption several transitional trajectories. Feng et al. (2014) model tariff uncertainty as a Poisson-process
with an arrival rate λ. In their empirical applications both papers compare scenarios analogous to moving
from δ > 0 to δ = 0, so that the simplifying notation used here should be sufficient to illustrate the policy
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τ p ≤ τE ≤ τnp. Equation (5) can be rewritten as
ϕ∗Jn = (τ
E
Jn)
σ
σ−1
[
fJn
EJn(1− )
] 1
σ−1
(
dJnw
PJn
)
(6)
and gives the key result of the bilateral model with tariff uncertainty.
Lemma 1 If τ pJ < τ
np
J , a removal of tariff uncertainty implies a reduction of the threshold
productivity level, ϕ∗, firms must achieve to export profitably.
This follows from the positive relationship between (expected) tariffs and the productivity
threshold, (∂ϕ∗/∂τE) > 0, and from the fact that expected tariffs equal the preferential rate
when uncertainty vanishes (δ = 0). If preferential and non-preferential tariffs are the same,
uncertainty has no effect on the productivity threshold, and nothing happens when it is
removed.
3.1.3 Product-level Predictions for Bilateral Trade
Firm-level export revenues rjn ≡ p˜jn(ϕ)xjn can be aggregated to obtain product-level pre-
dictions
RJn = aJnσ
(∫
j∈ΩJn
ϕσ−1dj
)
, (7)
where aJn ≡ τ−σJn d1−σJn AJn and AJn ≡
[(
σ
σ−1
)
w
PJn
]1−σ
EJn
σ
. The expression in parentheses is
equivalent to multiplying the total number of firms, MJ , with the fraction of firms residing
at or above the ZPC
RJn = aJnσMJ
(∫
ϕ∗Jn
ϕσ−1dGJ(ϕ)
)
. (8)
If productivities levels across firms are Pareto distributed,7 the probability that a random
productivity draw from this distribution exceeds its lower bound ϕL equals G(ϕ) =
(
ϕL
ϕ
)k
.8
spillover in the next subsection.
7This is a standard assumption in the context of generating aggregate predictions from the Melitz (2003)
model, and it is valid at least for the right tail of the distribution, where exporting firms typically reside.
8This feature suggests that the probability of a firm to have a certain productivity level ϕj > ϕL decreases
with the size of ϕj/ϕL. The shape parameter k raises this ratio to a power k > (σ − 1) so that a larger k
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Integrating (8) with G(ϕ) gives
RJn = aJn
(
1
ϕ∗
)k−σ+1
αJ , (9)
where αJ ≡ σMJϕkL kk−σ+1 represents a product-specific intercept. A gravity equation is
obtained by plugging (6) into (9) and taking logs
lnRJn = − σk
σ − 1 ln τ
p
Jn−δn
σk
σ − 1(ln τ
np
Jn−ln τ pJn)−k ln dJn+
k
σ − 1 lnAJn+lnαJ−
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 ln fJn.
(10)
Equation (10) illustrates how the removal of tariff uncertainty in destination n affects
exports to that country. As δn → 0, the second term of the right-hand side of the equa-
tion disappears, and exports to n increase. The log-difference between non-preferential and
preferential tariffs measures the “tariff threat” exporters face under uncertainty. Overall,
the removal of tariff uncertainty reduces the expected tariff rate. Accordingly, also the ZPC
goes down which implies that the adjustment takes place at the extensive margin. These
predictions have been confirmed for China’s exports to the US in previous studies (Handley
and Lima˜o, 2013; Feng et al., 2014).
3.2 Separable Fixed Costs and Multilateral Trade
The baseline model provides no explanation for increased exports to a country where policies
did not change. To establish this link, additional structure is imposed on the fixed market-
entry costs fJn. It is assumed that fJn can be separated into a local and a global component,
fJn ≡ fn + fJ .9 With this assumption the export decision of a firm becomes interdependent.
The global fixed cost component has to be paid irrespective of the number of destinations
a firm serves. It implies that the burden of the global fixed cost can be distributed across
implies a higher concentration of low-productivity firms and a smaller number of very productive firms.
9This is similar to Hanson and Xiang (2011) who analyze the relative importance of global and local
fixed costs. Focussing on US movie exports, they find that global fixed costs dominate. However, for
manufacturing trade, they acknowledge that bilateral fixed costs must play a larger role, since trade patterns
vary substantially across countries.
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sources of revenue. Considering firm j’s profits in all destinations n = {1, ..., N} total export
profits result as the sum of bilateral “partial” profits, p˜i, minus the global fixed cost:
p˜ij1 − fJ = τ−σJ1
(
dJ1
ϕj
)1−σ
EJ1 (1− )
(
w
PJ1
)1−σ
− f1 − fJ
+p˜ij2 = τ
−σ
J2
(
dJ2
ϕj
)1−σ
EJ2 (1− )
(
w
PJ2
)1−σ
− f2
... (11)
+p˜ijN = τ
−σ
JN
(
dJN
ϕj
)1−σ
EJN (1− )
(
w
PJN
)1−σ
− fN
Πj(N) ≡
N∑
n=1
p˜ijn − fJ = (1− )
(
w
ϕj
)1−σ N∑
n=1
[(
dJn
PJn
)1−σ
EJn
τσJN
]
−
N∑
n=1
fn − fJ .
The respective ZPC productivity Φ∗ for exporting to all N destinations follows as
Φ∗N = σ
1
σ−1
(w

)[ N∑
n=1
τ
σ
σ−1
Jn
(
fn + fJ
EJn
) 1
σ−1 dJn
PJn
]
. (12)
3.2.1 General Implications of the Multilateral Productivity Threshold
Equation (12) states the productivity threshold required for a firm that exports to all desti-
nations. Whether serving all destinations is optimal depends on the partial bilateral profits.
Lemma 2 Irrespective of global fixed costs fJ , a firm j exports to a destination n only if
bilateral partial profits are positive, p˜ijn ≥ 0.
This follows from Equation (11). A row with a negative partial profit lowers total ex-
porting profits. It implies that the number of destinations an exporting firm serves results
from an assessment of each market. To determine this number, destinations can be ranked
in decreasing order of the bilateral partial profits. The ranking is independent of the firm’s
individual productivity level. It then follows that
Lemma 3 If p˜ij1 ≥ p˜ij2 ≥ ... ≥ p˜ijN , and if global fixed costs can be covered, a firm exports
to all destinations for which p˜ijn ≥ 0 holds.
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Figure 4: Partial and Total Export Profits of Two Firms
0
Π, pi
1 N*lN*j Nmax
Total Profits, Π(j) Partial Profits, pi(j)
Total Profits, Π(l) Partial Profits, pi(l)
Note: Author’s calculations based on Eq. (11) with 100 destinations.
Figure 4 summarizes Lemmas 2 and 3 considering two firms with different productivity
levels. The horizontal axis denotes the range of potential export destinations n. They are
ranked in decreasing order of the partial profits. The solid line with negative slope denotes
these profits for firm ϕ(j). The lower dotted curve denotes its total export profits earned by
exporting to a respective number of destinations. Total profits rise, up to the point where
partial profits become negative. The firm’s optimal number of destinations is indicated at
point N∗j . The other firm l has productivity ϕl > ϕj and serves a larger number of countries.
This prediction conforms to evidence from firm-level data (e.g. Eaton et al., 2004). It leads
to a statement on the multilateral productivity threshold in Equation (12):
Lemma 4 If N = N∗ denotes the optimal number of destinations to which a firm exports,
then the productivity threshold Φ∗N is increasing in N .
Lemmas 2-4 hold also for the case where fixed costs are purely country-specific. The
distinct feature with a global fixed cost component arises when fJ is large enough to prevent a
firm from earning positive profits in the first destination p˜ij1−fJ < 0. If that is the case, a firm
13
might need the revenues from several markets in order to export profitably. This prediction
seems to be at odds with observations where firms export first to one destination and enter
additional markets when they grow. However, it is possible that Chinese manufacturers are
differnt. Amiti and Freund (2010) note that a large fraction of China’s recent export growth is
driven by processing trade. The firms carry out certain production processes but contribute
less to the development of a product or to distributing it to final customers. This allows
them to save destination specific costs by focussing on standardized processes. The global
fixed cost fJ is paid to attract orders from foreign firms that are willing to save labor costs
through outsourcing.10 The bilateral fixed cost fn governs the eligibility of Chinese firms to
be integrated in the production chain of certain countries.
3.2.2 Bilateral Tariff Uncertainty and Multilateral Trade
The effect of a reduction in tariff uncertainty on multilateral trade is illustrated with two
examples. The first assumes that countries are symmetric. The second example considers
the market size of the policy making country.
Two Symmetric Countries. Supposing that firms consider exporting to two foreign des-
tinations, n = {1, 2}, the baseline scenario describes the outcome where the tariffs are uncer-
tain in country 1. The applied tariff in country 1 corresponds to the preferential rate τ p1 = 1
but the non-preferential rate τnp1 = 2 might be applied with a probability δ1 = 0.5. The
expected tariff in country 1 is then τE1 = 1
0.520.5 ≈ 1.4. There is no uncertainty in country 2
so that the expected tariff corresponds to the applied preferential rate τE2 = τ
p
2 = 1. Equation
(12) is used to compute the ZPC productivity for any possible scenario. To obtain numerical
results it is assumed that the elasticity of substitution is σ = 3 and that all other non-tariff
10Empirical evidence along these lines is provided for Mexican firms that make investments to improve the
quality of their products before they start to export (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2012). Feng et al. (2012) find
that Chinese exporters benefited from importing larger amount of intermediate inputs after they entered the
WTO.
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variables equal 1.11
Table 1: Alternative Productivity Thresholds with Bilateral Tariff Uncertainty and Symmet-
ric Countries
(1) (2) (3)
Φ∗N Φ
∗
1 Φ
∗
2
Baseline: τE1 = 1.4 3.53 5.35 3.18
Treatment: τE1 = 1 2.90 3.18 3.18
Note: Author’s calculations based on Eq. (12)
with two destinations, σ = 3, and all variables
equal 1, except τE1 .
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 1 show ZPCs when firms export to both or only to one of the
two countries, respectively. The first row shows the baseline scenario with tariff uncertainty
in country 1. It suggests that most firms would export only to country 2 because column (3)
states the lowest threshold. The second row displays the ZPCs when uncertainty is removed.
It indicates that most firms will export to both destinations, as shown in column (1). The
regime shift from uncertainty to certainty in country 1 induces firm entry into both markets.
This follows because the ZPC without uncertainty is below any other ZPC of the baseline.
The firms that become exporters after the policy change have productivity ϕ ∈ (2.90; 3.18).
Three Asymmetric Countries. With three asymmetric countries n = {1, 2, 3}, it is
possible to analyze how the size of the policy-making destination affects the multilateral
threshold. Country 1 is again the one where tariffs are uncertain (τE1 = 1.4). Three scenarios
are considered where the size of country 1 is I. E1 = 1; II. E1 = 2; and III. E1 = 0.5 in the
respective cases. Country 2 is always large E2 = 2 and country 3 is always small E3 = 0.5.
Besides this parametrization, and σ = 3, all other non-tariff variables equal one.
Figure 5 illustrates how the removal of tariff uncertainty translates to multilateral exports.
It depicts the (log of the) Pareto-density function g(ϕ). Typically, most firms have a relatively
low level of productivity and very few firms are very productive. The baseline scenario is
11 σ = 3 follows Handley and Lima˜o (2013) who refer to estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006). Other
authors use σ = 4 (e.g. Head et al., 2014).
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Figure 5: Multilateral Productivity Thresholds with Bilateral Tariff Uncertainty and Asym-
metric Countries
II I III
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Exporters with τ1E=1.4
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Firm Productivity
    Pareto Distribution
I, II, III: Additional Exporters
in respective scenario
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Productivity φ
Note: Author’s calculations based on Eq. (12) with three asymmetric destinations (see text). Figure shows
Pareto density function g(ϕ) = kϕL
(
ϕL
ϕ
)k+1
with lower bound ϕL = 1 and shape-parameter k = 2. The
vertical axis is scaled in logs.
normalized and shows the ZPC applicable for exporting to countries 1 and 2.12 Only firms
residing to the right of the baseline ZPC export under tariff uncertainty. The shaded areas
indicate the amount of firms that become exporters when tariff uncertainty vanishes. It
shows the smallest amount for case III where country 1 is small. The largest amount of new
exporters is found for case II in which country 1 is big.
The figure suggests that the size of a market is correlated with the fraction of global
fixed costs it absorbs. If the policy-making country is very small, the effect of removing
TPU might be negligible. Scenario III suggests that uncertainty in country 1 induces the
least productive exporter to serve countries 2 and 3. When tariff uncertainty is removed the
threshold for exporting to 1 and 2 equals the ZPC of exporting to 2 and 3. As a result,
exports do not adjust at the multilateral level, because there is no additional entry of firms
12The baseline ZPC for exporting to all three destinations is always higher but the mechanics remain the
same.
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that were non-exporters in the first place.
The results for asymmetric countries in terms of market size carry over to heterogeneity in
terms of other country characteristics (e.g. bilateral trade costs). To evaluate the predictions
of the model, two hypotheses shall be spelled out:
Proposition 1 If τ pJn < τ
np
Jn, a removal of tariff uncertainty in a large country n induces an
increase in the value of exports to any other destination m 6= n with positive partial profits.
Proposition 2 If τ pJn < τ
np
Jn, a removal of tariff uncertainty in a large country n induces an
increase in the number of destinations N to which product J is exported.
Both propositions follow from a new ranking of a firm’s bilateral partial profits and the
possibility of re-distributing global fixed costs. As tariff uncertainty vanishes, non-exporters
are able to take into account additional revenues, enabling them to earn positive total ex-
porting profits. The policy spillover works through a reduction of the multilateral export
threshold. This implies that the adjustment takes place at the extensive margin. An inves-
tigation of the removal of US tariff uncertainty towards China will provide evidence on the
existence of countries that are large enough to generate the predicted effects.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Empirical Model
The empirical specification is derived from the previous section. It extends the gravity
equation stated in Equation (10) by the global fixed cost.
lnRJn = − σk
σ − 1 ln τ
E
Jn − k ln dJn +
k
σ − 1 lnAn + lnαJ −
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 ln (fn + θJnfJ) (13)
The parameter θJn indicates that a fraction of fJ is allocated to each destination n. It implies
0 < θ < 1 for any existing trade relationship and θJn = 0 whenever p˜iJn ≤ 0.
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An allocation rule could take the following form:
θJn ≡ p˜iJn
ΠJ − fJ ,
which ensures that the rankings of bilateral partial profits p˜iJn and of the same profits net of
global costs, p˜iJn − θJnfJ , are proportional. The interpretation is that a reallocation of the
fixed cost burden away from destination n increases exports to this country ∂RJn/∂θJn <
0. To incorporate the effect of θ into the estimation equation, it is assumed that θJn is
correlated with the tariff threat faced in a country m 6= n. In the context of this paper:
∂θJn/∂GAP
US
J > 0. The tariff uncertainty Chinese exporters faced in the US forced them to
increase θ for any other export destination.
The econometric analysis focusses on the removal of uncertainty. Hence, the variable
GAPUSJ is interacted with a period dummy D
T
t which equals zero before China’s WTO entry
and one afterwards. This is shown by the first term of the following equation:
lnRJnt = b1(GAP
US
J ×DTt ) + b2 ln τJnt + bJn + bnt + bSt + εJnt (14)
The sign of b1 is expected to be positive, since the removal of US tariff uncertainty reduces
θJn and increases RJn. The second term meausures the tariff rate in destination n and should
reveal a negative effect. The analysis focusses on China’s exports to EU countries, so it is
assumed that there is no tariff uncertainty, and ln τEJn = ln τ
p
Jn. The product-destination fixed
effect captures the country specific trade costs of shipping good J to its destination; bJn ≡
−k ln dJn. Destination-specific time effects bnt ≡ kσ−1 lnAnt control for changing aggregate
conditions in each destination, such as higher demand or prices. bJn and bnt absorb also the
local fixed cost component, fn. Finally, sector-time effects bSt capture variation in αJ over
time at a more aggregated level.
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4.2 Data and Measures
Estimating Equation (14) requires information on US MFN and Column 2 tariffs before
China’s WTO entry, to construct GAPUSJ , on applied EU tariffs for China, and on the value
of Chinese exports to the EU.
US tariff data is drawn from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) website
(Feenstra et al., 2002). The same data was used by Pierce and Schott (2013) to study the
effect of removing US tariff uncertainty on domestic manufacturing employment. The data
reports ad-valorem equivalents of applied tariffs at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS). This allows matching the data up to the 6th digit with product codes
of the Harmonized System nomenclature (HS6). The US tariff threat is calculated at the
disaggregated level and then averaged over the respective HS6 category J :
GAPUSJ,99 ≡
1
H(J)
H(J)∑
hts=1
ln τCol2hts,99 − ln τMFNhts,99 .
The definition GAPUSJ ≡ ln τCol2J − ln τMFNJ follows from the definition of the expected
tariff rate, ln τE = ln τ p + δ(ln τnp − τ p), where the expression in parentheses equals GAP .
Following other studies, the year 1999 is chosen to compute US tariff uncertainty. It varies
only across product categories J but will be interacted with the period dummy for China’s
WTO membership. In a final step the HS6 codes are harmonized over time to reflect the
classification of goods according to the HS 1988/1992 revision.13
European tariff data is obtained from the tariff schedules at the World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS). It reports ad-valorem equivalents at the 8-digit level of the Combined
Nomenclature (CN8). Also this classification can be matched with HS6 products at the
first six digits. A problem with this data is that information is missing for some years
and products, and that this is difficult to trace, because the raw data does not take into
account the revisions of product codes over time. Using the correspondence tables provided
13Correspondence tables for the HS nomenclature are available at the United Nations Statistics Division
(UNSD).
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by Bernard et al. (2012) helps to trace most products.14 A few remaining empty cells could be
filled using information from similar products where observable tariffs evolved identically. The
complete set of MFN rates is needed to compute GSP rates and those applicable to China in
each product year. The GSP discount factors and the exceptions for China were drawn from
the respective European Council Regulations. After aggregating and harmonizing product
codes according to the HS6 1988/1992 revision, tariffs were expressed as τ = 1+(%-rate/100).
The data on Chinese exports was obtained from the UN Comtrade Online Database.
Exports to the 15 EU members were selected and product codes were converted into the HS6
1988/1992 revision. Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country because they are
not reported separately in all years. To distinguish the extensive margin, missing information
on Chinese exports for a given HS6-country pair is assumed to reflect that no trade had taken
place. In a fully balanced panel, covering the years 1995-2005, observations with zero trade
amounts to 56 percent. Most export zeros are observed for Ireland (75%) and Austria (71%)
and the fewest are reported for exports to Germany (34%) and Italy (40%). These numbers
generally decrease over time.
5 Results
5.1 Main Findings
5.1.1 Level of Chinese Exports to the EU
Table 2 presents results from estimating Equation (14) for the period 1995-2005. The baseline
sample considers the full range of manufacturing products of which there are 3, 985, comprised
in the HS Chapters 28-96. About six percent of the products were not exposed to US tariff
uncertainty. The tariff threat for an average exposed product was 0.289 in 1999. The reported
results represent a sample with 14 destinations n and 11 sectors S.
14The CN8 correspondence tables for the most recent years are available at the EUROSTAT Reference and
Management of Nomenclatures (RAMON) archive.
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Column (1) reports a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the removal of
US tariff uncertainty. It suggests that Chinese exports of threatened products increased by
18.7 percent relative to a non-threatened product. Potentially differential patterns may arise
in the textile and clothing sector (T&C) where the EU removed quotas for Chinese goods in
2002, 2005, and 2009 (Utar, 2014). These goods are comprised in HS Chapters 50-67 and
were excluded in the estimation reported in column (2). The estimated effect is lower but
still statistically significant and positive. Column (3) controls explicitly for the removal of
quotas.15 It suggests that China’s exports increased due to both the removal of quotas and
the removal of US tariff uncertainty. The implied average increase is 11.7 percent relative to
non-threatened products.
The estimated coefficient can be interpreted in the context of the theoretical model.
According to Equation (13) it reflects the elasticity of exports with respect to a reduction of
the fixed-costs burden; (k−σ+1)/(σ−1). Column (3) suggests that a one percent reduction
increases exports by 0.405 percent. Head et al. (2014) estimate the Pareto parameter of
China’s firm productivity distribution to be k = 4.854. The implied elasticity of substitution
is σˆ = 4.455; not too far from to their parametrization (σ = 4).
Columns (4) through (6) adopt a discrete measure of the US tariff threat. Similar to
Handley and Lima˜o (2013) GAP is divided into groups. The first group (not shown) considers
the goods where GAP = 0, i.e. where Column 2 rates equalled the MFN tariff rate. The
second group considers the bottom quartile and the last group includes the top quartile of
the tariff threat. Half of the products fall into the third group, where GAP ranges between
0.19 and 0.35. All specifications confirm the qualitative results of the baseline specification.
Quantitatively, they suggest that US tariff uncertainty prevented market entry especially
when GAP ≥ p[25]. This corresponds to a difference of 0.187 log points or more between
Column 2 and MFN tariffs. For an average good in the top quartile, column (6) suggests
that exports increased by 17.3 percent relative to the non-threatened products. Table 2 also
15Information on the affected products is available online at the Syste`me Integre´ de Gestion des Licences
a` l’Exportation et a` l’Importation (SIGL).
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Table 2: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 after the Removal of US Tariff Uncertainty; Linear
Panel Regression, 1995-2005
Baseline Discrete Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Range: Full No T&C Full Full No T&C Full
US Tariff Threat 0.647∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.405∗∗
(0.076) (0.091) (0.077)
p[+]-p[25] 0.192∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.074) (0.076) (0.073)
p[25]-p[75] 0.400∗∗ 0.371∗∗ 0.387∗∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.071)
p[75]-p[100] 0.463∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.393∗∗
(0.072) (0.076) (0.072)
EU Tariff -0.386 0.283 -0.052 -0.524 0.088 -0.181
(0.420) (0.433) (0.419) (0.421) (0.435) (0.420)
EU Quota ’02 0.576∗∗ 0.576∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
EU Quota ’05 0.449∗∗ 0.446∗∗
(0.050) (0.049)
Observations 270,767 207,476 270,767 268,499 205,966 268,499
R-squared 0.170 0.176 0.172 0.171 0.177 0.173
Fixed effects All All All All All All
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), and data from various sources (see text). Fixed
effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
suggest that applied tariffs in the EU had no effect on China’s exports to the EU. This is
not surprising given that they changed only marginally during this period.
5.1.2 Extensive vs. Intensive Margin
To analyze the trade creation effect of the US policy change, patterns at the extensive mar-
gin are investigated. Table 3 presents results of different specifications that capture this
adjustment.
The first two columns present the odds-ratio and the coefficient of a logistic regression.
The dependent variable takes a value equal to one when China exports to a given product
destination at time t, and zero otherwise. Column (1) suggests that the removal of non-tariff
trade barriers, e.g. US tariff uncertainty and EU import quotas, increase the probability of
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Table 3: Chinese Market Entry in the EU-15 after the Removal of US Tariff Uncertainty;
Alternative Estimators, 1995-2005
Logistic Regressions Linear Regressions
Odd Ratio Coeff. # Destinations Norm. Growth Log Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US Tariff Threat 2.511∗∗ 0.921∗∗ 1.770∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.094a
(0.201) (0.080) (0.275) (0.034) (0.048)
EU Tariff 0.406∗ -0.902∗ 0.300 -0.010 -0.327
(0.169) (0.417) (1.071) (0.327) (0.405)
EU Quota ’02 1.157∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.920∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(0.040) (0.034) (0.144) (0.017) (0.023)
EU Quota ’05 2.115∗∗ 0.749∗∗ 1.234∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.683∗∗
(0.148) (0.070) (0.210) (0.039) (0.060)
Observations 341,814 44,038 284,134 204,837
R-squared 0.177 0.364 0.056 0.010
Fixed effects Jn, t J , St Jn, nt, St Jn, nt, St
Note: Table shows estimates based on alternative specifications. Columns (1) and (2) show results of a
logistic regression. Column (3) considers the number of EU-15 destinations served by China. The last two
columns compare the normalized (4) and the log-growth rate (5) of Chinese to the EU-15 over time. Fixed
effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Standard errors in parentheses;
significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
observing Chinese exports to a given European product-country pair. Higher tariffs make
trade less likely to occur. The signs of the coefficients stated in column (2) show the marginal
effects of a change in the independent variable on the odds ratio. As expected, tariffs reduce
the probability of exporting to the EU, whereas the removal of other trade barriers reveals
positive and statistically significant effects. Because the logistic regressions were not able to
include a complex fixed effects structure, column (3) considers an alternative specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the number of EU destinations to which China exports
good J . This reduces the dimension of the panel to have variation across products over time.
The result confirms that products with a high US tariff threat before China’s WTO entry
were exported to more destinations after the removal of the threat. The same is found for
the removal of import quotas on T&C products. Columns (4) and (5) consider a third test
against adjustments at the extensive margin. They report the estimated effect on the annual
growth rate of Chinese exports in a particular product destination pair. Column (5) uses
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the log-difference as a measure of the growth rate. By construction, it is confined to report
patterns at the intensive margin, because it cannot be computed when trade was zero at
the beginning or at the end of the period under consideration. The effect of the US policy
change is only marginally significant in statistical terms. In contrast, column (4) uses the
normalized growth rate (Davis et al., 1998; Pierce and Schott, 2013). It takes into account
entry and exit in export markets by taking its bound values gN ∈ [−2, 2]. The rate is defined
as
gN ≡ Rt −Rt−1
0.5(Rt +Rt−1)
If this growth rate is considered, the removal of US tariff uncertainty reveals a positive and
statistically significant effect. This result confirms that the US policy change encouraged
Chinese exporters to establish new trade relationships with EU countries.
5.1.3 Robustness
The removal of US tariff uncertainty was not the only change in trade policies that could have
caused China’s export boom after WTO accession. A number of alternative explanations are
taken into consideration to investigate whether the policy spillover picks up the effect of other
changes in China’s export oriented industries. Details on the data sources and construction
of variables are provided in the appendix to this paper.
Unobserved Productivity Effects upon WTO Accession. The first test analyzes
whether China’s WTO accession has had any productivity effects due to a general reduction
of economic uncertainty. Such a general effect might reveal structural patterns (e.g. due
to comparative advantage) and should be visible also in relative export prices (e.g. due to
investments into better technologies). Table A1 shows the results from including an interac-
tion of China’s inverted revealed comparative advantage (RCA) with the indicator variable
for China’s WTO membership. The inverted measure was chosen to point out the substan-
24
tial structural transition undergoing China’s exports since the early 1990s.16 While exports
of comparative disadvantage goods, as measured for the years 1995-1997, grew significantly
faster after China’s WTO accession, the removal of US tariff uncertainty continues to be
statistically significant. In columns (4) through (6) of the table, it can be observed that a
depreciation of China’s currency towards the currencies of the European importers has con-
tributed to this transition, facilitating export growth in comparative disadvantage industries.
A similar result is obtained when changes in Chinese relative export prices are taken into
consideration (Table A2). The data uses quality-adjusted export prices from Feenstra and
Romalis (2014). Their change between 1997-1999 and 2002-2004 was interacted with the
WTO dummy. The results shown in columns (1) through (3) show how decreasing export
prices facilitated exports to the EU. In columns (4) to (6) changes in EU countries’ relative
import prices are used to deflate export price changes, and the pattern can be confirmed.
In all specifications, statistical significance and estimated magnitude of the effect of the US
policy change remain unaffected.
Removal of Investment Restrictions in China. An alternative explanation for the rise
of Chinese exports could be changes in the business environment in China. In particular, upon
WTO entry, China complied to an equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. This
may have encouraged offshoring and other investments into China’s manufacturing indus-
tries. I follow Pierce and Schott (2013) by approximating products’ elasticity to investment
restrictions using measures of products’ contract intensity from Nunn (2007), and interacting
them with the WTO dummy. It should be expected that investment and exports rise more
for products where the contract intensity is high.
Table A3 shows the results from re-estimating (14), augmented by the interaction of
products’ contract intensity with China’s WTO dummy. Columns (1) through (3) of the table
refer to the strict measure of contract intensity, which measures the share of differentiated
16At a more aggregate level, it can be seen that China’s share of Textile, Clothing, and Apparel in total
manufacturing exports declined from 45 to about 20%, while the share of machinery and electronics products
grew up to 40%, by 2012.
25
input goods used in the production. Columns (4) through (6) consider the broader measure,
which is based on the cumulated share of differentiated and reference-priced input goods.
Contract intensity is statistically significant, suggesting that the rise of Chinese exports to
the EU is partly driven also by China’s removal of foreign investment restrictions. The table
confirms the statistical validity of the US policy spillover, except for one specification, in
column (5), where the effect is only marginal. However, since the broader measure includes
inputs with an intermediate degree of diversification, and hence contracting intensity, is not
entirely clear whether the result unambiguously captures the removal of Chinese investment
restrictions.17
Export Subsidies. Production subsidies may have led to higher exports in some product
categories. To investigate such effects, data from Bown (2014) and Bown (2015) are used
to control for HS6 products subject to anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD)
measures in the European Union. AD-filings of products exported from China to the EU
could be observed throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Columns (1) through (3) of Table A4
indicate that exports of these goods decreased while they were subject to investigations, until
the file was closed or countermeasures were revoked. In columns (4) through (6), additional
information is included, for goods which became subject to CVD, since 2010. Although the
data for European CVD cases starts only after the first decade of the 2000s, interacting these
products with the WTO indicator suggest that China may have subsidized their exports
starting from an earlier time.
In all specifications, the estimates for the US policy change remain positive and statis-
tically significant, and in similar orders of magnitude than in the baseline estimations. In
fact, the explanatory power of the empirical model remains merely unchanged. This might
indicate that the indirect information on export subsidies does not cover all of the relevant
products.
17Moreover, estimating the same equation based on a restricted sample suggests a robust US policy spillover
at the 5 percent level or better (see Appendix for details).
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5.2 Further Results
The main findings could not reject either proposition made at the end of Section 3. This sub-
section attempts to provide further results that support the mechanism emphasized through-
out this paper.
5.2.1 US Share in Chinese Exports
A main concern could be that the US policy change operates through a different mechanism
than the redistribution of a global fixed costs burden. The problem is that such costs cannot
be observed. To provide further (suggestive) evidence, the proposed allocation rule for θJn
will be addressed. The interpretation was that the US policy change invoked the allocation
of a larger fraction of fJ to the US so that EU markets become easier to penetrate. This
fraction is assumed to be proportional to the share of the partial bilateral profit in total
export profits. To analyze this, the explanatory variable GAPUSJ is replaced by the fraction
of China’s total exports of product J that is shipped to the US before and after WTO entry.
The variable is constructed by calculating the average sJ,US = RJ,US/RJ ≈ θJ,US, re-
spectively for two periods 1992-2000 and 2002-2009. For the first period it yields s¯preJ,US, the
fraction of exports of J shipped to the US before China’s WTO entry. For the second period
s¯postJ,US denotes the fraction of exports of J shipped to the US after China’s WTO entry. In
order to capture the change of this fraction the difference ∆s¯USJ = s¯
post
J,US − s¯preJ,US is used to
replace GAPJ in Equation (14). A positive ∆s¯
US
J suggests that China exports more of good
J to the US compared to the years before its WTO membership. This implies that a larger
fraction of the global fixed cost burden is covered through this trade relationship.
The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) is analogous to the third column of
Table 2. The estimated coefficients for EU tariffs and the quota removals are qualitatively
and quantitatively unchanged. The coefficient obtained for the US share in Chinese exports
is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, it exceeds that obtained from the original
specification. An explanation could be that ∆s¯USJ can take negative values allowing it to
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Table 4: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 and the Role of Trade with the US; Alternative
Estimators, 1995-2005
Baseline Logit Linear Regressions
Levels Odd Ratio Coeff. # Dest. Norm. vs. Log Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US Share 0.789∗∗ 3.371∗∗ 1.215∗∗ 2.073∗∗ 0.030 0.039
(0.090) (0.293) (0.087) (0.348) (0.037) (0.058)
EU Tariff -0.073 0.429∗ -0.847∗ 0.403 -0.000 -0.328
(0.420) (0.180) (0.419) (1.068) (0.327) (0.406)
EU Quota ’02 0.595∗∗ 1.222∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 1.029∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.091∗∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.142) (0.016) (0.023)
EU Quota ’05 0.448∗∗ 2.102∗∗ 0.743∗∗ 1.228∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 0.685∗∗
(0.050) (0.147) (0.070) (0.213) (0.039) (0.060)
Observations 267,870 337,711 43,307 281,203 202,702
R-squared 0.173 0.183 0.374 0.056 0.010
Fixed effects Jn, nt, St Jn, t J , St Jn, nt, St Jn, nt, St
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), but with a different treatment variable instead of GAP .
Fixed effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
better describe the conditions of Chinese exporters willing to export to the EU. Related
to this, the removal of US tariff uncertainty does not explain the entire pattern of Chinese
exports to the US, so that ∆s¯USJ provides a more complete assessment of the theoretical
model. The remaining columns are analogous to Table 3. Except for columns (5) and (6)
the previous results are confirmed. Together this analysis suggests that Chinese exporters
benefit from selling much of their exports in the US. This supports the hypothesis of an
existing global fixed cost burden and the associated economies of scale.
5.2.2 Dynamic Adjustments and Transitional Growth
So far, the analysis has concentrated on the years immediately after China’s WTO accession.
Available trade and tariff data allows an extension of the analysis up to the year 2012 so
that the effect can be studied over a longer period. Re-estimating Equation (14) for the
years 1995 up to 2012, using GAPUSJ and taking into account the removal of import quotas,
produces a coefficient bˆ1 = 0.691 (see Table 5). It is larger and statistically different from
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that obtained for the baseline period shown in Column (3) of Table 2. One explanation could
be that the US policy change interacts with a dynamic component. While Section 3 considers
comparative statics, it is possible that firms gradually increase their production capacities and
exploit their full cost advantage with a delay. A complementary explanation would be that
some firms start to export only when they observe the success of other firms (e.g. Hausmann
and Rodrik, 2003). Following these arguments, a dynamic specification should eliminate the
positive correlation between estimates of b1 and the length of the post WTO-entry period.
Including a lagged endogenous variable lnRJnt−1 on the right-hand side of the estimation
equation may create problems due to correlated errors which lead to biased coefficients.
However, biased coefficients can be controlled by inferring the upper and lower bounds of
the true coefficient of lnRJnt−1. It should lie between the estimate obtained from a dynamic
pooled OLS model (POLS) and a dynamic fixed effects (FE) model (Roodman, 2009). The
former will overestimate the true coefficient, while the latter will produce a downward biased
estimate for the lagged endogenous variable. Hence, a downward-biased dynamic specification
will pick up some but not all of the dynamics that were induced by the US policy change. It
should produce more consistent coeffients bˆ1 as the period under study is extended to more
recent years.
The left panel of Table 5 shows the results for the full 1995-2012 period, for each of
the three specifications considered: baseline in column (1), dynamic FE in column (2), and
dynamic POLS in column (3). The POLS model generates a higher coefficient for the lagged
endogenous variable than the FE model. In the two dynamic specifications, the removal of
the US tariff threat reveals a lower coefficient for GAP than in the baseline. However, the
POLS model produces unplausible results for the effect of EU tariffs, and also the effects of
the removal of quotas in the EU become fragile. It seems that the FE model in column (2)
produces more plausible results overall.18
18Assuming that the baseline specification in column (1) represents the long-run effect of the policy spillover,
the estimate must be compared to blong1 = b1/(1−γ), where γ denotes the coefficient for the lagged endogenous
variable. For column (2), the implied long-run effect is 0.543. This indicates that the coefficient in column
(1) is biased upwards.
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Table 5: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 after the Removal of US Tariff Uncertainty; Static
and Dynamic Effects, 1995-2012
Levels 1995–2012 Growth 1995–T
Baseline FE POLS T = 2002 T = 2006 T = 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US Tariff Threat 0.691∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.030
(0.085) (0.056) (0.023) (0.072) (0.031) (0.026)
EU Tariff -3.050∗∗ -2.024∗∗ 0.867∗∗ -0.056 -0.205 -0.005
(0.420) (0.312) (0.110) (0.397) (0.319) (0.270)
EU Quota ’02 0.391∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.017 0.287∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.038) (0.026) (0.013) (0.035) (0.016) (0.014)
EU Quota ’05 0.484∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.396∗∗ 0.241∗∗
(0.046) (0.032) (0.017) (0.026) (0.016)
EU Quota ’09 0.870∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.046
(0.071) (0.041) (0.028) (0.029)
Lagged Exports 0.442∗∗ 0.825∗∗
(0.003) (0.001)
Observations 508,433 414,950 414,154 182,946 321,436 472,600
R-squared 0.313 0.474 0.746 0.045 0.078 0.116
Fixed effects Jn, nt, St Jn, nt, St nt, St Jn, nt, St Jn, nt, St Jn, nt, St
Note: Table shows estimates from alternative specifications. Columns (1) through (3) compare the baseline
specification to dynamic panel estimates providing lower and upper bounds of the coefficient for lagged
exports (shown in the last row). Columns (4) through (6) analyze the transitional growth effect of GAPU.S.J,99
by comparing periods of different length after the policy change. Abbreviations represent fixed effects
model (FE), pooled OLS (POLS), and the last year observed in the sample for which results are shown
(T ). Fixed effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure 6 presents the point estimates of the effect of GAPUSJ graphically. In Panel (a)
it shows results analogous to columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 where the sample period was
expanded stepwise (T = 2002, ..., 2012). The dashed line shows how the baseline specification
produces higher coefficients bˆ1 as the period gets longer. The immediate effect for T = 2002
is bˆ021 = 0.214. In the dynamic FE model the immediate effect is the same and remains
within the confidence intervals of any other period length. This is indicated by the solid line
in Panel (a) where bˆ1 still increases over time but remains statistically the same. Together
with k = 4.854 bˆ021 = 0.214 implies that σˆ ≈ 5. This estimate is still plausible given that
estimates vary considerably across countries (Imbs and Me´jean, 2010).
The right panels of Table 5 and Figure 6 analyze the evolution of the growth rate. As
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Figure 6: Evolution of the US Policy Effect on Chinese Exports to the EU; 2002-2012
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Note: Figure shows estimated effects of GAPUSJ on the level (Panel a) and normalized growth rate (Panel
b) of Chinese exports to the EU-15 as obtained from varying period length 1995-T (T = 2002, ..., 2012). All
regressions include product-country, sector-year, and country-year effects.
was shown in column (4) of Table 3, the average annual growth rate of products exposed
to high uncertainty increased after China’s WTO entry. If this effect was due to the policy
change, it should disappear as the year of the WTO accession moves further into the past.
Columns (3) to (6) show econometric results for the normalized growth rate. In the first year
of China’s WTO membership, the estimated coefficient is between 2.5 and 3 times larger
than that of the years up to 2006. The last column shows that growth rates do not differ
when the period is extended up until 2010. Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows how the effect phases
out and disappears after 2006. Together, the results presented in this subsection suggest that
the analyzed effects reflect a spillover from a change in US policies towards China on the
performance of Chinese exports to the EU. Moreover, the analysis of the fraction of China’s
exports shipped to the US supports the assumption of a global fixed cost component.
6 Conclusion
The paper analyzed a potential source of China’s export boom to the EU. In contrast to the
US, where China benefited from the establishment of permanent normal trade relations, EU
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trade policies remained largely unchanged upon China’s accession to the WTO. A transmis-
sion channel is proposed through which the change in the US trade policy affected China’s
trade performance at a more general level. It emphasizes the existence of a global fixed cost
component which Chinese exporters must cover before they start exporting. This component
can be distributed across sources of revenues, so that a firm entering the US market will find
it easier to export also to the EU. The predictions of the model were confirmed empirically
using product-level data at the disaggregated HS6 level. Chinese exports to the EU are about
12 percent higher for goods that were exposed to US tariff uncertainty before WTO entry. In
line with the theoretical model, adjustments at the extensive margin could be verified. An
analysis of how the effect of the US policy spillover evolves over time suggested that it levels
out after a few years.
The findings of this paper bear important implications for the scope of international
policy negotiations, as well as for their impact on third countries. To the extent that details
about negotiations remain unobserved they may expose firms to unexpected competitive
shocks. A closer analysis of the consequences is a possible direction of future research.
The paper also presented supportive evidence that exporters face both destination specific
and global fixed costs. This complements findings presented by Hanson and Xiang (2011)
for services exports, but raises the question as to how this conforms to stylized patterns
observed in manufacturing firm-level datasets. Characteristics of the production processes
(i.e. standardized vs. differentiated goods) might be one explanation worth pursuing further.
A final result revealed in this paper relates to the estimation of model parameters. The
estimated effect of the US policy spillover appeared to be correlated with the length of the
sample period. A dynamic specification was able to produce more robust quantitative results.
With regard to estimating certain parameters of a model, neglection of underlying dynamic
processes may lead to serious biases and misinterpretations of the importance of economic
variables.
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A Appendix
A.1 Robustness Checks
This appendix describes data and shows the results of various robustness checks discussed in
the main text of this paper.
Unobserved Productivity Effects upon WTO Accession. The baseline sample used
for the analysis of general productivity effects is the same as described in 4.2. The measures
for China’s RCA were downloaded from the CEPII website (Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales), which provides this information according to the 4-digit HS
nomenclature, at the most disaggregated level.19 Information on exchange rates was drawn
from the Penn World Tables 8.0, which provides countries’ nominal exchange rates, expressing
its domestic currency in US dollars. Exchange cross-rates, i.e. (Yuan/USD)/(ECU/USD),
were computed to obtain bilateral exchange rates for China towards European importing
countries. An increase of this exchange rate indicates depreciation, and hence easier market
access for Chinese exporters. Before re-estimating (14), including the inverted RCA measure,
the data was aggregated to the 4-digit HS level. The estimation results shown in Table A1
encompassed 915 4-digit product categories, 14 destinations, and 11 years.
The results shown in Table A2 use information on quality adjusted prices from Feenstra
and Romalis (2014).20 The raw datasets report detailed information exports, imports, unit
values, estimated quality, and quality-adjusted prices, among others, for the years 1989-
2011, at the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 level. The data on quality-adjusted prices are expressed
relative to a benchmark country, which varies across years, products, and product units.
Accordingly, for each product-unit-year the quality-adjusted price for a country was deflated
by the corresponding average of all countries. That is, China’s relative quality-adusted export
price for a SITC-unit pair j, at time t, is p˜cnjt = p
cn
jt /p¯jt. Relative quality-adjusted import
19http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=26
20They can be downloaded at http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Html/Quality_Data_Page.html
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Table A1: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 in Comparative Disadvantage Industries; Alterna-
tive Samples and Specifications, 1995-2005
Specification Details: Inv. RCA Interaction Inv. RCA and Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Range: Full No T&C Full Full No T&C Full
US Tariff Threat 1.195∗∗ 0.779∗∗ 1.051∗∗ 1.197∗∗ 0.782∗∗ 1.053∗∗
(0.151) (0.177) (0.151) (0.150) (0.177) (0.151)
EU Tariff -1.943∗ -0.654 -1.338a -1.952∗ -0.647 -1.346a
(0.761) (0.800) (0.763) (0.761) (0.800) (0.763)
EU Quota ’02 0.069∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
EU Quota ’05 0.069∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.013) (0.0126)
Inverted RCA 1.199∗∗ 1.119∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 1.164∗∗ 1.079∗∗ 1.145∗∗
(0.073) (0.079) (0.073) (0.075) (0.081) (0.075)
Inv. RCA×Xrate 0.080∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.0823∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
Observations 90,363 73,534 90,363 90,363 73,534 90,363
R-squared 0.252 0.257 0.254 0.252 0.257 0.255
Fixed effects Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), but including also a measure of revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) from CEPII, computed for the years 1995-1997. Columns (1)-(3) use the inverted
measure interacted with WTO membership, wheras columns (4)-(6) use in addition an interaction of inv.
RCA with China’s nominal exchange rate to EU-15 member states (see text for further details). Fixed
effects: Jn=4-digit product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
prices of each EU-15 member state were computed analogously.
In the next step, the unit-specific relative prices were aggregated to the SITC level, using
relative export as weights. Changes in relative prices were calculated to identify productivity
increases around China’s WTO accession. It uses the average relative price of product s
at time t0 (1997-1999) to deflate its corresponding value at t1 (2002-2004). The change in
Chinese relative quality adjusted export prices are thus:
∆p˜cs = p˜
c
st1/p˜
c
st0,
which corresponds to the results shown in columns (1) through (3) of Table A2. Columns
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(4) through (6) divide this ratio by the corresponding ratio for EU country i’s import price:
p˙cs = ∆p˜
c
s/∆p˜
i
s.
The price data was matched with the baseline dataset using correspondence tables from
the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). The estimations were carried out after ag-
gregating the data to the 4-digit SITC level, which resulted in 562 product categories. 2-digit
SITC codes reporting any MFA quotas were excluded in columns (2) and (4), respectively. As
before, the product-specific price changes were interacted with the WTO indicator variable.
Table A2: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 and Export Price Changes; Alternative Samples
and Specifications, 1995-2005
Specification Details: Price Change Exports Price Change Exports, deflated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Range: Full No T&C Full Full No T&C Full
US Tariff Threat 1.243∗∗ 0.906∗∗ 1.186∗∗ 0.974∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.932∗∗
(0.222) (0.239) (0.221) (0.225) (0.242) (0.224)
EU Tariff -5.878∗∗ -4.163∗∗ -5.536∗∗ -6.037∗∗ -4.415∗∗ -5.771∗∗
(1.048) (1.058) (1.049) (1.044) (1.050) (1.045)
EU Quota ’02 0.034∗∗ 0.0311∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
EU Quota ’05 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Q-adj. Exp. Price -1.155∗∗ -1.351∗∗ -1.157∗∗ -0.896∗∗ -1.140∗∗ -0.897∗∗
(0.131) (0.143) (0.131) (0.105) (0.119) (0.105)
Observations 60,115 56,670 60,115 58,963 55,578 58,963
R-squared 0.327 0.323 0.328 0.333 0.328 0.333
Fixed effects Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), but includes information on quality adjusted export and
import prices from Feenstra and Romalis (2014), between 1997-1999 and 2002-2004. Columns (1)-(3) use
changes of relative prices for Chinese exports, wheras columns (4)-(6) deflate those price changes by changes
in EU’s relative import prices (see text for further details). Fixed effects: Jn=4-digit SITC product-
destination, nt=destination-year, St=2-digit SITC sector-year. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Removal of Investment Restrictions in China. The contract-intensity measures from
Nunn (2007) are based on detailed US manufacturing input-output tables in the year 1997.21
Identifying differentiated and homogeneous input goods, the share of the former in total man-
ufactured input goods produces an industry-specific measure of contract intensity according
to the NAICS nomenclature (North American Industry Classification System). The identifi-
cation of differentiated and homogeneous goods is based on the classification of Rauch (1999).
Since he groups products into three categories (differentiated, reference priced, and traded on
organized exchanges), Nunn (2007) offers two measures of contract intensity. The first uses
only the share of differentiated inputs, whereas the second uses the share of differentiated
and reference priced goods together.
To match the information on contract intensity with the the HS6 codes of my dataset, I
use the correspondece files provided by Pierce and Schott (2009) for the year 1995 (where my
dataset starts). NAICS codes in the contract intensity dataset are slightly more aggregated
than in the concordance files, so that about 39 percent of the NAICS codes had to be
mapped by hand (172 out of 442). Table A3 shows results for the full sample, including both
automatically and hand matched products.22
Export Subsidies. The inference of Chinese production and export subsidies is indirect.
It uses information on products for which the EU initiated anti-dumping (AD) and counter-
vailing duty (CVD) investigations against China.
The data on AD filings is available from Bown (2014), and reports cases initiated by the
EU since the 1970s. To select the relevant cases, AD filings against China were selected,
if their final decision on domestic industry injury was affirmative, and if the imposed AD
measures were not revoked by 1995. The affected products, reported at the 8-digit level, were
aggregated to 6-digits and coded equal to one for the years when their investigation started,
21The measures of products contract intensity are available at different levels of aggeregation at http:
//scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0.
22The results for the restricted sample indicate a higher robustness of the US policy spillover, and are
available upon request.
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Table A3: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 and Products’ Contract Intensity; Alternative
Samples and Measures, 1995-2005
Contract Intensity Measure: Differentiated Inputs Non-homogeneous Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Range: Full No T&C Full Full No T&C Full
US Tariff Threat 0.593∗∗ 0.201∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.176a 0.334∗∗
(0.076) (0.090) (0.077) (0.076) (0.091) (0.077)
EU Tariff -0.367 0.275 -0.0330 -0.442 0.210 -0.107
(0.420) (0.434) (0.420) (0.420) (0.434) (0.420)
EU Quota ’02 0.572∗∗ 0.571∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
EU Quota ’05 0.436∗∗ 0.446∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
Contract Intensity 0.316∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.649∗∗ 0.546∗∗ 0.651∗∗
(0.076) (0.083) (0.076) (0.115) (0.124) (0.115)
Observations 267,631 205,406 267,631 267,631 205,406 267,631
R-squared 0.172 0.177 0.174 0.172 0.177 0.174
Fixed effects Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), but including also a measure of products’ contract intensity
(Nunn, 2007). Columns (1)-(3) use the measure based on differentiated inputs only, wheras columns (4)-
(6) use the measure accounting for all non-homogeneous intermediate inputs (see text for further details).
Fixed effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
and unitl the AD measure was revoked. In total, 83 HS6 codes were subject to AD measures
in the estimations (Table A4).
The data on CVD is available from Bown (2015), and reports cases initiated by the EU
since the 1970s. For China, however, CVD investigations were filed only since 2010. I selected
those filings where the final decision on domestic industry injury was affirmative and CVD
measures were in force. Although the reporting appeared about one decade after China’s
WTO entry, their exports may have been subsidized from an earlier time on. To controll
for this possibility, the respective HS6 products were interacted with the WTO indicator.
In total, HS6 codes were subject to CVD measures in the estimations (Table A4, columns
(4)-(6)).
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Table A4: Chinese Exports to the EU-15 and Products subject to Anti-dumping and Coun-
tervailing Measures; Alternative Samples and Specifications, 1995-2005
Specification Details: AD Filings AD Filings & CVD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Range: Full No T&C Full Full No T&C Full
US Tariff Threat 0.646∗∗ 0.233∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.648∗∗ 0.233∗ 0.406∗∗
(0.076) (0.091) (0.077) (0.076) (0.091) (0.077)
EU Tariff -0.437 0.231 -0.101 -0.437 0.231 -0.102
(0.421) (0.435) (0.420) (0.421) (0.435) (0.421)
EU Quota ’02 0.577∗∗ 0.576∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
EU Quota ’05 0.447∗∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.050) (0.050)
EU AD Filings -0.086a -0.235∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.090a -0.234∗∗ -0.097∗
(0.048) (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.0467)
EU CVD 0.520∗∗ 0.310 0.507∗
(0.201) (0.198) (0.200)
Observations 268,499 205,966 268,499 268,499 205,966 268,499
R-squared 0.171 0.176 0.173 0.171 0.176 0.173
Fixed effects Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St Jn,nt,St
Note: Table shows estimates based on Eq. (14), but including also an indicator variable for products
subject to anti-dumping (AD) filings and countervailing duties (Bown, 2014, 2015). Columns (1)-(3) use
the AD indicator, which equals one for the years in which products were under investigation until the
case was closed. Columns (4)-(6) augment the model by interacting products with the WTO indicator,
when they became subject to countervailing duties after China’s WTO entry (see text for further details).
Fixed effects: Jn=product-destination, nt=destination-year, St=sector-year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; significance: a p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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